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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between international financial integration and macroe-
conomic volatility. Looking at a panel of 90 countries over the period 1960-2000, we find that
domestic financial conditions matter when assessing the impact of financial integration on con-
sumption growth volatility. More specifically, consumption growth volatility is found to increase
with the degree of financial integration in countries with low level of financial development and
to decrease in countries with high level of financial development. When measuring domestic
financial conditions by the share of private credits to GDP, the threshold level of financial devel-
opment above which financial integration yields consumption smoothing benefits is estimated to
be around 60%-70% GDP.
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1 Introduction
International financial integration has considerably increased since the late 1980s and 1990s, and
it is considered as a source of important potential benefits. First, opening to international capital
markets provides additional resources to finance investment and may therefore lead to greater capi-
tal accumulation, especially in countries where the saving capacity is constrained by a low level of
income. In addition, financial integration can lead to more efficient capital allocation by enhancing
market discipline and by strengthening the banking system. Together, increased capital allocation
and increased allocative efficiency are expected to lower the cost of investment, and hence foster
higher growth. Another major source of benefits is to facilitate international risk sharing by pro-
viding more opportunities for portfolio diversification. This channel provides additional means of
insurance for firms, allowing them to invest in high-risk/high-return activities and to fully exploit
their comparative advantage by reducing production risk induced by more specialized activities.
Finally international trade in assets should yield consumption smoothing benefits by allowing risk
averse agents to better protect themselves against idiosyncratic shocks.
However, if these potential benefits are well established in theory, the empirical evidence are
mixed and rather weak. While most of the empirical literature dealing with financial integration had
focused on assessing the impact of capital account openness on the growth rate (Edison et al., 2002)
, the attention has recently shifted to the relationship between financial openness and macroeco-
nomic volatility. After the financial crisis of the 1980’s and 1990’s which followed capital account
liberalization reforms, some authors have argued that financial integration could be a source of
greater macroeconomic volatility, exposing vulnerable countries to sudden reversals of capital flows
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). According to this line of explanation, some countries may be more
likely to experience higher macroeconomic volatility, either because they lack a policy instrument to
smooth cycles, or because they lack the adequate financial institutions to cope with large and sudden
reversals of capital flows.
Even without considering extreme episodes of macroeconomic volatility such as financial cri-
sis, it might also be the case that financial integration, associated with weak domestic financial
institutions, exacerbate existing distortions due to credit market imperfections, thus yielding higher
business cycle volatility. In the presence of informational asymmetries and/or limited enforceabil-
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ity of contracts for example, capital account openness provides additional liquidity to the domestic
banking system and higher leverage for borrowing firms. In this context, financial integration may
amplify the financial accelerator mechanism identified by Bernanke et al. (2000).
From a welfare perspective, there are two alternative ways to see the relationship between finan-
cial integration and macroeconomic volatility. The first view is that financial integration should help
countries to untie consumption streams and output streams, allowing risk averse agents to smooth
consumption and leaving output volatility inconsequential for welfare. Another way is to consider
that in addition to consumption volatility, output volatility is also detrimental for welfare. Along
this line, Ramey and Ramey (1995) have shown that volatility has a detrimental impact on output
growth even after controlling for investment.
Existing empirical evidence are mostly based on cross sectional analysis, and suggest either the
absence of any significant link between financial openness and macroeconomic volatility in general,
or that consumption volatility tends to increase with the degree of financial integration for low
and middle income countries (Prasad et al., 2003). Regarding consumption growth volatility, this
contradicts the idea that capital account openness allows international risk sharing and consumption
smoothing.
This paper is an empirical attempt to determine whether domestic financial conditions matter in
the relationship between international financial integration and volatility. More specifically, I use
a panel of 90 countries over the period 1960-2000 to examine explicitly the role of the interaction
effects between international and domestic finance in the relationship between financial integration
and volatility. I look at consumption growth volatility to assess whether more financially integrated
countries have experienced higher degrees of consumption smoothing, and to what extent does this
depend on the level of domestic financial development. Moreover, since output growth volatility has
been shown to have adverse effects on economic growth, I also examine whether or not financial
openness has been associated with more volatile output growth rates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the related literature, sec-
tion 3 presents the data and the methodology, section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
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2.1 Financial integration and macroeconomic volatility
Economic theory does not give a clear-cut prediction on the expected impact of financial integration
on volatility. Under standard preferences, agents are risk averse and hence trade in international
assets should allow them to smooth consumption over time. If taste shocks are important however,
allowing for more international trade in assets would drive consumption volatility up. For output
growth volatility, the impact is also ambiguous. On one hand, opening the capital account can yield
lower output volatility by promoting production base diversification. On the other hand, output
volatility can rise if the consequence of financial integration is to facilitate the exploitation of com-
parative advantages and to yield increasing production specialization. To analyze this impact, most
models are based on standard 2 countries dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setups, and their
predictions depend on the nature of the assumed shocks that hit the economy (e.g. Mendoza (1994),
Baxter and Baxter and Crucini (1995), and Sutherland (1996) amongst others).
Compared to the rich literature dealing with the empirical impact of financial integration on
economic growth, the number of empirical studies focusing on macroeconomic volatility is much
more limited.
2.1.1 Empirical evidence
Most existing empirical evidence suggest the absence of a strong relationship between financial
integration and macroeconomic volatility.
Razin and Rose (1994) assess the impact of current and capital account openness on volatility
of output, consumption and investment by using a cross-sectional approach. They estimate the
following regression model:
σj,i = α+ βj,CFCi + βj,KFKi + εj,i
where j = Y,C, I are the variables of interest (output, consumption and investment), σ is the stan-
dard deviation of the de-trended variables, and FCi (resp. FKi) is a measure of current account
(resp.capital account) openness. The main result is the absence of any significant relationship be-
tween openness and any of the volatility series.
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Easterly et al. (2004) examine the sources of output growth volatility for a broad sample of
countries over two long periods, 1960-1978 and 1979-1997. Using (2 periods) panel OLS and IV
methods, they find that trade openness exposes a country to greater volatility, but neither the level
of private capital flows, nor the volatility of these flows, have a significant impact on output growth
volatility. The level of financial development however, appears to have a significant smoothing effect
on output growth, but the impact is nonlinear. Deep financial systems seem to reduce volatility, but
only up to a certain threshold. This threshold for private credit is estimated to be around 100 percent
of annual GDP which is relatively high.
Buch et al. (2002) focus on OECD countries using annual data from 1960 to 2000, and their
analysis is based on Sutherland (1996). They propose the following model:
σi,t = α0,i + α1,t + β1σ
controls
i,t + β2FOi,t + ui,t
where σi,t is the standard deviation of the cyclical component of real GDP computed over 5-years
time periods, and FOi,t is a measure of financial openness. According to Sutherland’s model,
financial openness should magnify monetary shocks and dampen budgetary shocks. The main result
is the absence of significant relationship between financial openness and output volatility. The results
support the model’s predictions that financial integration amplifies monetary shocks and dampens
fiscal shocks.
Kose et al. (2003) (henceforth KPT) look at the volatility of output growth, of consumption
growth and also at the relative consumption volatility (ratio of consumption volatility to output
volatility), for a sample of 76 countries over the period 1960-1999. They use two indicators of fi-
nancial openness: a dummy variable for capital account restrictions and private capital flows. The
results confirm the smoothing impact of financial development and the positive impact of trade open-
ness on volatility. Financial openness appears with a non significant positive sign when regressed on
output and consumption volatility, but its impact is strongly significant and non linear when look-
ing at the relative consumption volatility. These results suggest that increasing financial integration
brings benefits in terms of consumption smoothing only beyond a certain level of financial openness
(the estimated threshold for private capital flows is around 49% of GDP). Below that level, con-
sumption volatility is found to increase with the degree of financial integration. It must be noted
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that only some industrialized countries experience such high levels of private capital flows relative
to their GDP. Since this result holds also for relative consumption volatility, the authors argue that
the positive impact of financial integration on consumption volatility cannot be explained away by
the fact that integrated countries have experienced economic crisis.
Previous empirical studies have tried to assess the influence of financial conditions on volatility
by looking at both domestic and external finance, independently of each other. This paper seeks to
investigate further these links by examining explicitly the interaction effects between international
financial integration and domestic financial development in their relationship to macroeconomic
volatility.
2.1.2 Financial integration, financial development and macroeconomic volatility
Aghion et al. (1999) and Aghion et al. (2000) show that economies with low level of domestic
financial development should experience more volatile growth rates. However Beck et al. (2001)
argue that this is not necessarily the case, and that the effect of financial development on volatility
depends on whether the economy is affected by real or monetary shocks. Using a panel of 63
countries over the period 1960-1997, they find no robust relationship between financial development
and output growth volatility.
There has been a recent growing interest in analyzing the interdependence between domestic and
foreign financial markets. Chang and Velasco (1999) examine the influence of foreign banks and
foreign investors on domestic banking systems, while Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) focus
on the role of the domestic financial system to access international markets. In Broner and Ventura
(2005), domestic and foreign risk sharing are connected because the government cannot discriminate
between domestic and foreign agents. Because of this mechanism, they show that when the asset
market is incomplete due to sovereign risk, financial globalization can lead to losses of risk sharing
opportunities both within and between countries, and hence to loss in welfare.
Leblebicioglu (2005) analyzes formally the interaction effects between domestic credit market
imperfection and financial integration. She develops a two-country two-sector real business cycle
model where one of the countries faces asymmetric credit conditions in the sense that traded good
(T) firms have access to international finance while non traded good (NT) firms are restricted to the
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imperfect domestic capital market. The credit market imperfection in the home country comes from
an assumption that entrepreneurs in the NT sector borrow directly from workers to finance their in-
vestment. In doing so they also face a borrowing constraint specified as a collateral constraint. The
proportion of net worth determining the maximum amount of loans is the parameter that represents
the domestic credit market imperfection. In this model, after a positive productivity shock in the NT
sector, workers want to consume more but they are also poorer because of terms of trade effects.
Under perfect financial integration, workers can borrow from the foreign country to sustain their
consumption level. Under autarky however, the only way workers can increase their revenue is to
work more for the T sector. This worsens the terms of trade and hence make the home consumption
bundle more expensive which dampens the increase in consumption. Under this mechanism pro-
ductivity shocks in the credit constrained NT good sector brings higher consumption volatility and
higher relative consumption volatility under financial integration than under financial autarky.
In this paper, we examine empirically the interaction effects between domestic financial sector
and international financial integration. We use the GMM-IV estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to ask (1) whether financial integration has a signifi-
cant impact on macroeconomic volatility, and (2) whether this relationship depends on the level of
financial development. The following section presents the data and the methodology.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 GMM-IV panel estimation methods
The use of GMM-IV panel methods offers many advantages compared to the estimation methods
previously used in the literature, most of which are cross-section based or rely on very short panels.
First, it improves on cross-sectional analysis by exploiting the temporal dimension of the data, and
this additional source of variability provides more degrees of freedom to estimate the parameters of
interest. Second, by estimating a fixed effects model, one can control for unobserved time invariant
heterogeneity in the data. Third, by using lagged variables as instruments, GMM-IV estimators deal
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explicitly with the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables1. Fourth, this class of estimator
is consistent for large N and small T, which fits the structure of our sample.
We want to look at the impact of financial integration on medium to long term volatility, while
keeping the time dimension of the dataset long enough. Therefore we choose to work with non-
overlapping five-years periods from 1960 to 2000. This gives an unbalanced panel of 90 countries
and 8 time periods. Since there is no reason a priori to specify a dynamic equation for macroe-
conomic volatility, the model is estimated both under a static and a dynamic specification. The
empirical results suggest however that past volatility is relevant in explaining current volatility both
for consumption growth and output growth. The following presentation of the regression framework
is based on a dynamic specification.
Consider the following regression model:
yi,t = αyi,t−1 + βxi,t + ηi + vi,t
with ηi and vit independently distributed across i, E [ηi] = E [vi,t] = E [ηivi,t] = 0 for i = 1, ..., N
and t = 2, ..., T , and E [vi,tvi,s] = 0 ∀t "= s.
With this specification and our panel structure (longN and short T ), OLS and WITHIN estima-
tors are biased, Maximum Likelihood estimators will depend heavily on the assumed distribution for
initial conditions and the 2SLS estimator proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) lacks asymptotic
efficiency (Bond, 2002). Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) have proposed
linear GMM-IV estimators which are consistent and asymptotically efficient under relatively weak
assumptions. The ”System-GMM” estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) consists in
estimating a system of equations (one for each time period) specified in level and in first difference.
Adequate lagged levels of endogenous and predetermined variables, along with contemporaneous
levels of strictly exogenous variables are then used as instruments for the first differenced equations,
exploiting the following moment conditions:
E [Z ′i∆vi] = 0
1The type of endogeneity that is allowed for in Arellano and Bover (1995) is one in which a variable xit may be correlated
with current and past values of the error term vit, but not with future realizations (weak exogeneity).
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where Z is the matrix of instrument and ∆vi = (∆vi3,∆vi4, ...,∆viT )′. Under the additional
assumption that the first differences ∆xit are uncorrelated with the individual fixed effects ηi, ap-
propriate lagged values of ∆xis also enter the instrument matrix for the equations in level. The
GMM-IV estimator then minimizes
JN =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
∆v
′
iZi
)
WN
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
Z
′
i∆vi
)
with
WN =
[
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
Z
′
i∆̂vi∆̂v
′
iZi
)]
as a weighting matrix. ∆̂vi are consistent estimates of the first differenced residuals obtained in a
first step. If the disturbances vit are homoskedastic, then this ”two-step” estimator has an asymptot-
ically equivalent ”one-step” version2.
The validity of the assumed moment conditions can be tested with Hansen’s or Sargen’s overi-
dentifying restriction tests. Serial correlation tests are also needed to assess the validity of the
instruments.
3.2 Estimation strategy and Data
We consider the following two equations for the dynamic specification:
σij,t = ασij,t−1 + β1Q
′
i,t + β2FDi,t + β3FIi,t + ηi + εi,t (1)
σij,t = ασij,t−1 + β1Q
′
i,t + β2FDi,t + β3FIi,t + β4(FDi,t ∗ FIi,t) + ηi + εi,t (2)
with i = 1, ..., N , t = 1, ..., 8 and where σij,t denotes the standard deviation of the annual growth
rate of variable j = Y,C,C + G computed over 5-years windows. We consider GDP (Y ), private
consumption (C) and total consumption (C+G). All these variables are expressed in real per capita
terms. Qi,t is a set of control variables, FDi,t is a measure of financial development, and FIi,t
is a measure of financial integration. The parameters of interest are β2, β3, and β4 which captures
2Simulations show that the asymptotic standard errors tend to be too small for the ”two-step” version. Windmeijer (2000)
analyzes this issue and proposes finite sample corrections for the variance.
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the potential interaction effect between financial integration and financial development. With this
formulation, we allow the impact of one of these two variables to depend on the level of the other. β2
and β3 in (1) are marginal impacts of, respectively, financial development and financial integration,
unconditional on the level of the other variables. In contrast, β3 in (2) represents the marginal
impact of financial integration conditional on the level of financial development being zero, and the
analog interpretation for β2 also holds.
The data are taken from the Penn World Tables (mark 6.1) and the World Development Indi-
cators3. Standard determinants of macroeconomic volatility are included in the control set Q. We
control for volatility of inflation and of terms of trade, for the degree of trade openness and also
for the share of agriculture in GDP to capture primary product dependence. We also include time
dummies in the regressions. Table 13 shows the correlation matrix of the selected variables.
We use a measure of domestic credit to the private sector as a proxy for financial development. It
is the value of credits provided by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. This
measure of financial development is standard in the finance literature4, and it excludes credit issued
to the governments, to government agencies, and to public enterprises, and also credits provided
by the central bank. While this measure does not directly measure credit market imperfections,
one can interpret higher levels of domestic private credit as proxying greater financial intermediary
development. For financial integration, we chose not to use qualitative measures for two reasons.
First, to the extent that they are de jure measures, they do not necessarily capture the effective
exposition to capital flows. Latin America for example has relatively high measures of capital control
but also high levels of capital flows, while on the other hand, Africa has relatively low capital
controls without experiencing high levels of capital flows. The second reason is that qualitative
measures do not vary over time as much as quantitative measures. Among the existing de facto
measures, we use the share of private gross capital flow on GDP because it is the most widely
available measure in terms of period and country coverage.
Figures 1 to 3 show some basic trends in the evolution of the main variables of interest. For the
whole sample5, financial integration and financial development rose steadily over the period 1960-
3Complete data description is given in table 1
4See Levine et al. (2000) for a discussion on this indicator compared to alternative ones, in a financial development/growth
context.
5See the country list in table 2.
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2000, with an acceleration of financial integration since the mid 1990’s (fig.1). On the other hand,
output growth volatility declined significantly from 1960 to 2000, with interruption periods of higher
volatility, in the 1970’s and the 1990’s. Private consumption is more volatile than output volatility
over the whole sample, but total consumption volatility is closer to output volatility, underlining the
consumption smoothing role of government expenditures.
4 Results
We estimate equations (1) and (2) using the ”System-GMM” estimator described above. Both the
”one step” and ”two step” versions of the system estimator are implemented to check whether the
results are sensitive to potential heteroskedasticity. We focus first on output growth volatility and
on absolute consumption growth volatility (private consumption and total consumption). When
building the instrument matrix, we treat all explanatory variables as being potentially endogenous,
except the time dummies, the agricultural share of GDP, and the volatility of terms of trade which
we treat as strictly exogenous6. The estimation results are given in tables 3 to 5. All t-values are
based on robust estimation for the ”one-step” version, and on Windmeijer’s finite sample correction
for the ”two-step” version. Serial correlation tests are reported in the tables to assess the validity of
the chosen instruments7, and both Hansen’s and the Sargan’s overidentifying restriction tests suggest
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the moment conditions are valid.
We report standardized coefficients8. The estimated coefficients have the expected sign. The
lagged dependent variable coefficient has a significant and positive sign with magnitude less than
one. Given that we are considering 5 years periods, this suggests that output and consumption
volatility are relatively persistent. Moreover, this also supports the dynamic specification adopted
here. Inflation volatility impacts positively on output growth volatility, as do terms of trade volatility
and the share of the agricultural sector on GDP. However, these variables do not have a significant
influence on consumption growth volatility. Trade openness also appears with a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient, which is in line with Rodrik (1998) argument: more open economies are more
6Treating terms of trade volatility as endogenous did not change the results.
7No second order serial correlation is detected, so lagged variables of endogenous variables starting from lag t − 2 and
backward are valid instruments.
8The coefficients are the estimated standard deviation change in the dependent variable for one standard deviation change
in the corresponding explanatory variable.
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specialized and thus experience larger income shocks, which, combined with imperfect capital mar-
kets, lead to greater macroeconomic volatility. This result is also consistent with the findings of
Kose et al. (2003), and Easterly et al. (2004).
The decline in output growth volatility over the sample period is better explained by the evo-
lution of trade openness, inflation, primary product dependence and terms of trade, rather than by
the financial variables. For output growth volatility, the financial variables do not have any signifi-
cant impact on volatility, regardless of whether we consider the interaction term or not. The point
estimates for (2) suggest that financial integration has a positive impact on output growth volatility
up to a certain level of financial development (around 70%-80% GDP), but the coefficients are far
from being statistically significant. This finding is consistent with previous empirical results and
with most theoretical models which predict an ambiguous impact of financial integration on output
growth volatility, depending on the nature of the shocks that hit the economy. For domestic financial
development, this result is in line with Beck et al. (2001).
Now we turn to consumption volatility. When the interaction between financial development
and financial integration is not taken into account, estimates of (1) show that the marginal impact of
financial development on volatility is negative for private and total consumption growth volatility,
while the impact of financial integration is positive. These coefficients are however not significantly
different from zero at the 95% confidence level. In other words, taken independently of each other,
domestic and external financial conditions do not affect consumption volatility. This result contra-
dicts the idea that allowing for more trade opportunities in international assets should allow agents
to better share risk and to smooth their consumption plan. Although surprising, this finding is in line
with previous empirical studies that did not find any significant relationship between the degree of
financial integration and macroeconomic volatility.
However, if we look now at the estimates of (2), we see that accounting for the interaction
term matters when evaluating the marginal impact of financial integration on consumption volatility.
Including the interaction term in the regression equation, the coefficient of financial integration (β3)
becomes positive and strongly significant. This means that conditional on the level of financial
development being zero, consumption volatility increases with the degree of financial integration.
Besides, the interaction term (β4) has a significantly negative coefficient, suggesting that as the
level of financial development increases, the positive impact of financial integration on consumption
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volatility looses strength. Moreover, since |β4| > |β3|, there is eventually a point at which financial
development is sufficiently high (say FD∗) to allow the marginal impact of financial integration on
consumption volatility to change sign. In other words, financial integration has a positive impact on
consumption volatility when financial development is low, but when the domestic financial system
is strong enough, i.e when FDi,t > FD∗, then financial integration lowers consumption volatility.
Previous empirical work seeking to assess the impact of financial integration on macroeconomic
volatility found either the absence of a robust link, or that financial integration impacts positively on
consumption volatility. The main contribution of this paper is to show that the impact of financial
integration on consumption volatility depends on the level of financial development. Consumption
volatility increases with financial integration for low levels of financial development, and smoother
consumption is associated with financial integration for high levels of financial development. From
a policy perspective, this result suggests that reforms aiming at strengthening the domestic financial
system should be a prerequisite to capital account liberalization.
Computing the threshold level FD∗ of financial development from the unstandardized point
estimates, it appears that the benefits of financial integration in terms of consumption smoothing
occur after financial development (i.e the GDP share of credits to the private sector) has reached a
level of about 55%-60% of GDP for private consumption (see table 9). This is a relatively high level
of financial development as only 17% of our sample (mostly industrial countries) experience such
levels of financial development. Whether we consider a static or a dynamic version of (1) and (2)
yields very similar results9. Moreover, the results do not vary much whether we consider ”one-step”
or ”two-step” estimation, suggesting the absence of heteroskedasticity in the disturbances. Finally,
the results are robust to alternative financial development indicators10.
Next, from these point estimates, we compute the total marginal effect of financial integration
conditional on the level of financial development as:
βFIit =
d[σi,t]
d[FIi,t]
= β3 + β4FDi,t
9These results are not reported here but are available on request.
10Similar results are obtained with alternative indicators based on private credit (private credit provided by the banking
sector, private credit by deposit money bank), and also with other indicators such as liquid liabilities (M3) as a % of GDP, or
financial depth (M2) as a % of GDP.
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and its associated standard error as:
SE(βFIit ) =
√[
V AR (β3) + FD2i,tV AR(β4) + 2FDi,tCOV (β4,β3)
]
Both the total marginal effects and their associated standard errors are functions of FDi,t. Figures 4
and 5 show the estimated coefficients and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals for absolute
and relative consumption volatility. These confidence intervals reach their minimum value close to
the estimated threshold, and they get wider as one moves away from it. For both private and total
consumption, the estimated coefficient is significantly positive (above the zero line) for low levels
of financial development, it is close to zero for intermediate range and negative for high values of
financial development. The standard errors get quite large as we move away from the estimated
threshold. A possible explanation is that multicollinearity effects introduced by the interaction term
inflate the variance of the estimated coefficients. The sample correlation coefficient between finan-
cial integration and the interaction term (see table 8) is indeed relatively high (0.88). Multicollinear-
ity would however only influence the precision of the estimator, and not its consistency property.
Hence, this potential effect only strengthens our finding. These results are conservative in the sense
that even in the presence of potentially inflated variances due to multicollinearity effects, financial
integration remains significantly associated with higher consumption volatility for low level of fi-
nancial development, and with smoother consumption for sufficiently developed financial systems.
Without multicollinearity effects, the confidence intervals around the estimated total marginal im-
pact would be narrower, yielding a higher threshold level of financial development below which
financial integration impacts positively on consumption volatility, and a lower threshold level of fi-
nancial development above which financial integration is expected to bring consumption smoothing
benefits.
We saw that financial integration affects consumption volatility but not output volatility. In order
to be sure that the changes in consumption volatility are not driven by changes in output volatility
we also look at the ratio of consumption growth volatility to output growth volatility. The results for
relative consumption volatility are reported in tables 6 and 711 and they confirm what we found for
the absolute level of consumption volatility. Financial integration has a strong positive impact on
11In contrast with output and consumption equations, serial correlation tests detect second order serial correlation. Hence,
only lags starting from t− 3 and backward provide valid instruments for the endogenous variables.
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relative consumption volatility for low levels of financial development. Above a threshold level of
financial development (around 65%-70% of GDP for private consumption, see table 9), the marginal
impact of financial integration is to reduce consumption volatility relative to output volatility.
Overall, these results suggest that for most countries in the sample, the marginal effect of fi-
nancial integration is to increase absolute and relative consumption volatility. Only a small number
of countries with sufficiently developed financial systems will experience consumption smoothing
benefits from financial integration. Looking at absolute private consumption volatility, figure (6a)
shows a cross plot of financial integration against financial development for countries with low levels
of financial development (below 35% of GDP). These are the countries for which financial integra-
tion is significantly associated with more volatile consumption. Most of the developing countries in
the sample belong to this group. African countries are typically characterized by low levels of both
financial development and financial integration. Among these countries with low level of financial
development, we also find some Latin American countries with relatively higher levels of financial
integration, and which have been subject to financial crisis in the 1980’s (Mexico) and in the 1990’s
(Argentina). Figure (6b) instead plots the few countries with level of financial development above
the estimated threshold level (59%). These are the countries for which financial integration is ex-
pected to bring consumption smoothing benefits. Most of these are rich and industrialized countries.
Now we want to have an idea of the magnitude at which consumption volatility responds to
changes in the degree of financial integration. We compute the elasticity of consumption volatility
with respect to changes in the degree of financial integration as:
εit =
d[σit]
d[FIit]
FIit
σit
= (β3 + β4FDit)
FIit
σit
These elasticities are evaluated at the mean value of financial integration and of financial devel-
opment over the period 1960-2000. Figures 7 and 8 show these elasticities for a selected group of
countries. If we look at countries with low level of financial development (credit to the private sector
below 35% GDP), the elasticity of absolute private consumption volatility (following a 1% change
in the degree of financial integration) ranges from 0.01% (Zimbabwe) to 0.34% (Guatemala), but
most values of the estimated elasticities lie between 0.01% and 0.1%. If we look now at countries
with high level of development (above 59%), these elasticities range from -0.37% (Japan) to -0.01%
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(Italy), with most values between -0.2% to -0.01%.
Summarizing our findings, the first result is that the decline in output volatility over the sample
period is better explained by the traditional indicators rather than by the financial variables. Second,
for low levels of financial development consumption volatility increases with financial openness,
both in absolute and relative to output volatility. However, when the domestic financial system is
sufficiently developed, financial integration yields consumption smoothing benefits. The estimated
threshold level of financial development at which the marginal impact of financial integration on
volatility changes sign is relatively high. Only 17% of the sample at most experience consumption
smoothing benefits from financial integration, most of which are industrialized countries.
5 Conclusion
In theory, the ability to trade internationally in assets should help risk averse agents to untie their
consumption stream to their income stream and thus should facilitate consumption smoothing. How-
ever, recent empirical evidence have suggested either the absence of a significant correlation, or
the opposite relationship, namely that more financially integrated countries have experienced more
volatile consumption, especially for emerging market economies in the late 1980’s and 1990’s.
The contribution of this paper is to show that the interaction between domestic and external
market matters in assessing the relationship between financial integration and consumption volatility.
Financial integration is associated with higher volatility in consumption growth rates if the level of
domestic financial development lies below a threshold level. This result holds both for consumption
in absolute terms and relative to output volatility. The threshold level of financial development,
measured by the share of private credits to GDP, is estimated to be around 55%-60% for absolute
consumption volatility and around 65%-70% for relative consumption volatility. Above this level,
consumption smoothing benefits are expected. It appears however that only a limited number of
industrial countries benefit from international financial integration as far as consumption smoothing
is regarded. In terms of policy, this suggests that sound domestic financial system should be a
prerequisite to capital account liberalization reforms in developing countries.
Our findings are consistent with general equilibrium models including frictions both in the do-
mestic and in the international financial markets Leblebicioglu (2005). These results support the
16
idea that when the domestic financial system is weak, exposition to international capital flows might
exacerbate existing distortions due to capital market imperfections, and hence amplify economic
fluctuations. An other interpretation goes along the lines of Broner and Ventura (2005) in the sense
that rising financial globalization can be associated with the destruction of risk sharing opportunities
when asset markets are incomplete.
17
References
P. Aghion, P. Banerjee, and T. Piketty. Dualism and macroeconomic volatility. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 114:1359–1397, 1999.
P. Aghion, P. Bachetta, and A. Banerjee. Capital markets and the instability of open economies. In
P. Agenor, M. Miller, D. Vines, and A. Weber, editors, The Asian Crisis: Causes, Contagion and
Consequences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 2000.
T. Anderson and C. Hsiao. Estimation of dynamic models with error components. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 76:598–606, 1981.
M. Arellano and S. Bond. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte carlo evidence and an
application to employment equations. Review of Economics Studies, 58:277–297, 1991.
M. Arellano and O. Bover. Another look at the instrumental-variable estimation of error-component
models. Journal of Econometrics, 68:29–52, 1995.
M. Baxter and M. Crucini. Business cycles and the asset structure of the foreign trade. International
Economic Review, 36:821–854, 1995.
T. Beck, M. Lundberg, and G. Majnoni. Financial intermediary develoment and growth volatility.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2707, World Bank, 2001.
B. Bernanke, M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist. The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle
framework. In J. Taylor andM.Woodford, editors,Handbook of Macroeconomics. North Holland,
Amsterdam, 2000.
R. Blundell and S. Bond. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models.
Journal of Econometrics, 87:115–143, 1998.
S. Bond. Dynamic panel data models: A guide to micro data methods and practice. Working Paper
09/02, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2002.
F. Broner and J. Ventura. Managing financial integration. mimeo, 2005.
C. Buch, J. Dopke, and C. Pierdzioch. Financial openness and business cycle volatility. Working
Paper 1121, Kiel Institute for World Economics, 2002.
18
R. Caballero and A. Krishnamurthy. International and domestic collateral constraints in a model of
emerging market crises. Journal of Monetary Economics, 48:513–548, 2001.
R. Chang and A. Velasco. Liquidity crises in emerging markets: theory and policy. In B. Bernanke
and J. Rotemberg, editors, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, pages 11–58, 1999.
W. Easterly, R. Islam, and J. Stiglitz. Shaken and Stirred: Explaining Growth Volatility. Annual
World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, World Bank, 2004.
H. Edison, R. Levine, and T. Slok. International financial integration and economic growth. Journal
of International Money and Finance, 21:749–776, 2002.
G. Kaminsky and C. Reinhart. The twin crisis: The causes of banking and balance-of-payment
problems. American Economic Review, 89:473–500, 1999.
M. Kose, E. Prasad, and M. Terrones. Financial integration and macroeconomic volatility. IMF Staff
Papers, (50):119–142, 2003.
A. Leblebicioglu. Financial integration, credit market imperfections and consumption smoothing.
Job Market Paper, Boston University, 2005.
R. Levine, N. Loayza, and T. Beck. Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 46:31–77, 2000.
E. Mendoza. The robustness of macroeconomic indicators of capital mobility. In L. Leiderman and
A. Razin, editors, Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption, Investment, and Growth, pages
83–111. Cambridge University, Cambridge, 1994.
E. Prasad, S. Wei, K. Rogoff, and A. Kose. The effects of financial globalization on developing
countries: Some empirical evidence. IMF Occasional Paper 220, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, 2003.
G. Ramey and V. Ramey. Cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth. Ameri-
can Economic Review, 85:1138, 1995.
19
A. Razin and A. Rose. Business-cycle volatility and openness: An exploratory cross-sectional
analysis. In L.Leiderman and A. Razin, editors, Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption,
Investment, and Growth, pages 48–76. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
D. Rodrik. Who needs capital account convertibility? In S. Fisher et al., editors, Should the IMF
Pursue Capital Account Convertibility? Essays in International Finance, number 207. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1998.
A. Sutherland. Financial market integration and macroeconomic volatility. Scnadinavian Journal of
Economics, 98:521–539, 1996.
F. Windmeijer. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step gmm estima-
tors. Journal of Econometrics, 126:25–51, 2000.
20
Tables
Table 1 Data description and sources
Variable name and description Source
Output Summers and Heston PWT 6.1
Real GDP per capita (Constant price: Laspeyres) series code: RGDPL
Private consumption Summers and Heston PWT 6.1
Consumption share of RGDPL series code: KC
Government consumption Summers and Heston PWT 6.1
Government share of RGDPL series code: KG
Inflation World Bank WDI
log (1+inf) where inf is inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) series code: NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG
Terms of trade World Bank WDI
Net barter ToT (1995=100) series code: TT.PRI.MRCH.XD.WD
Agriculture World Bank WDI
Agriculture, value added (% GDP) series code: NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS
Trade openness World Bank WDI
Trade (% GDP) series code: NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
Financial developement World Bank WDI
Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) series code: FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS
Financial integration World Bank WDI
Gross private capital flows (% GDP) series code: BG.KAC.FNEI.GD.ZS
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Table 2. Country List
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras,
Hong Kong SAR, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lesotho, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States,
Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Dependent: Output Growth Volatility
Standardized Coefficients One Step System Two Step System
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.170 0.171 0.177 0.176
(1.74)* (1.78)* (2.21)** (1.97)**
Inflation Volatility 0.187 0.203 0.210 0.237
(2.07)** (2.35)** (2.49)** (3.49)***
Terms of Trade Volatility 0.152 0.148 0.154 0.145
(2.60)*** (2.56)** (2.37)** (2.12)**
Agriculture Share 0.170 0.168 0.146 0.125
(2.40)** (2.42)** (2.07)** (1.86)*
Trade Openness 0.125 0.121 0.116 0.121
(2.08)** (1.86)* (1.84)** (1.81)*
FD Financial Development -0.005 -0.0006 -0.004 0.003
(0.12) (0.01) (0.09) (0.09)
FI Financial Integration 0.018 0.019 0.024 0.047
(0.76) (0.22) (0.98) (0.70)
FI*FD -0.020 -0.054
(0.16) (0.54)
Observations 363 363 363 363
Number of id 90 90 90 90
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.041 0.043 0.069 0.075
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.348 0.348 0.400 0.410
AR(3) test (p-value) 0.381 0.395 0.426 0.454
t-stats in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in ”Two Step System”.
* 90%, ** 95%, and *** 99% confidence level.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 4 Dynamic specification
Dependent: Private Consumption Growth Volatility
Standardized Coefficients One Step System Two Step System
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.290 0.264 0.305 0.261
(3.12)*** (2.95)*** (3.24)*** (2.85)***
Inflation Volatility 0.053 0.038 0.041 0.039
(0.60) (0.44) (0.46) (0.42)
Terms of Trade Volatility 0.099 0.085 0.099 0.081
(1.38) (1.29) (1.34) (1.14)
Agriculture Share 0.020 0.016 0.016 0.023
(0.32) (0.27) (0.25) (0.40)
Trade Openness 0.245 0.296 0.243 0.293
(2.15)** (2.59)** (2.16)** (2.20)**
FD Financial Development -0.094 -0.033 -0.091 -0.032
(1.51) (0.64) (1.36) (0.57)
FI Financial Integration 0.030 0.244 0.032 0.263
(0.62) (2.16)** (0.65) (2.22)**
FI*FD -0.353 -0.383
(2.46)** (2.65)***
Observations 361 361 361 361
Number of id 89 89 89 89
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.406 0.331 0.432 0.364
AR(3) test (p-value) 0.403 0.415 0.472 0.466
t-stats in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in ”Two Step System”.
* 90%, ** 95%, and *** 99% confidence level.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 5 Dynamic specification
Dependent: Total Consumption Growth Volatility
Standardized Coefficients One Step System Two Step System
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.222 0.187 0.218 0.180
(2.70)*** (2.42)** ( 2.49)** (2.53)**
Inflation Volatility 0.265 0.256 0.269 0.267
(3.02 )*** (2.99)*** (2.65)*** ( 3.17)***
Terms of Trade Volatility 0.091 0.079 0.096 0.092
(1.23) (1.13) ( 1.20) (1.18)
Agriculture Share 0.112 0.114 0.105 0.118
(1.55) (1.70)* (1.98)** ( 2.20)**
Trade Openness 0.152 0.192 0.144 0.176
(1.69)* (1.99)** (2.05)** (1.96)**
FD Financial Development -0.083 -0.016 -0.079 -0.029
(1.51) (0.30) (2.27)** (0.62)
FI Financial Integration 0.043 0.287 0.038 0.266
(0.72) (2.27)** (0.62) (2.11)**
FI*FD -0.368 -0.335
(2.10)** (1.90)*
Observations 361 361 361 361
Number of id 89 89 89 89
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.190 0.306 0.268 0.376
AR(3) test (p-value) 0.608 0.831 0.642 0.823
t-stats in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in ”Two Step System”.
* 90%, ** 95%, and *** 99% confidence level.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 6 Dynamic specification
Dependent: Relative Consumption Volatility (private)
Standardized Coefficients One Step System Two Step System
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.132 0.081 0.118 0.075
(0.87) (0.76) (0.73) (0.64)
Inflation Volatility 0.011 0.020 -0.021 -0.001
(0.06) (0.13) (0.15) (0.01)
Terms of Trade Volatility 0.023 0.000 0.010 -0.002
(0.44) (0.02) (0.26) (0.05)
Agricultural Share 0.073 0.075 0.069 0.067
(0.92) (0.95) ( 0.91) (0.72)
Trade Openness 0.293 0.293 0.299 0.298
(2.30)** (2.21)** (2.35)** (2.47)**
FD Financial development 0.038 0.126 0.048 0.141
(0.42) ( 1.39) (0.39) ( 1.49)
FI Financial integration 0.004 0.336 0.023 0.334
(0.08) (2.46)** (0.41) (2.90)***
FI*FD -0.422 -0.413
(2.94)*** (3.39)***
Observations 361 361 361 361
Number of id 89 89 89 89
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.056 0.032
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.044 0.033 0.175 0.118
AR(3) test (p-value) 0.225 0.366 0.330 0.442
t-stats in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in ”Two Step System”.
* 90%, ** 95%, and *** 99% confidence level.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 7 Dynamic specification
Dependent: Relative Consumption Volatility (total)
Standardized Coefficients One Step System Two Step System
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.399 0.313 0.405 0.312
( 2.41)** ( 1.89)* (2.70)** (2.18)**
Inflation Volatility -0.006 -0.006 0.017 -0.035
(0.06) (0.07) (0.36) (0.58)
Terms of Trade Volatility -0.004 -0.026 -0.019 -0.016
(0.10) (0.62) (0.35) (0.32)
Agricultural Share 0.149 0.173 0.126 0.147
(1.90)* (2.26)** (1.50) (1.88)*
Trade Openness 0.312 0.306 0.311 0.304
(2.47)** ( 2.34)** (2.77)*** (2.54)**
FD Financial Development -0.041 0.076 -0.054 0.049
(0.61) (1.28) (0.82) (0.71)
FI Financial Integration 0.010 0.476 0.009 0.447
(0.16) (3.09)*** (0.14) (2.58)***
FI*FD -0.564 -0.474
(3.42)*** (2.35)**
Observations 361 361 361 361
Number of id 89 89 89 89
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.019 0.036 0.023 0.028
AR(3) test (p-value) 0.339 0.657 0.369 0.588
t-stats in parentheses, Windmeijer correction in ”Two Step System”.
* 90%, ** 95%, and *** 99% confidence level.
Time dummies are included but not reported.
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Table 8 Correlation matrix
Whole sample Vol(Y) Vol(C) Vol(inf) Vol(ToT) Agric. Open. FD FI FI*FD
Vol(Y) 1.00
Vol(C) 0.5593 1.00
Vol(inf) 0.3004 0.2381 1.00
Vol(ToT) 0.3615 0.2159 0.1574 1.00
Agric. 0.2897 0.1514 0.1279 0.3000 1.00
Open. 0.1455 0.2355 0.0566 -0.0442 -0.1592 1.00
FD -0.3581 -0.2876 -0.1872 -0.3119 -0.5994 0.0410 1.00
FI -0.0121 0.0464 0.0335 -0.0776 -0.2242 0.3332 0.2535 1.00
FI*FD -0.1073 -0.0494 -0.0191 -0.1404 -0.2683 0.3609 0.4609 0.8844 1.00
Table 9
Estimated Thresholds of Financial Development (private credit in % GDP)
Point estimates of the threshold level of FD at which
the marginal effect of FI on volatility changes sign.
Dependent Variable: V ol(C) V ol(C +G) V ol(C)
V ol(Y )
V ol(C+G)
V ol(Y )
Dynamic specification, One-Step 58.9 66.5 67.7 71.8
Dynamic Specification, Two-step 58.4 67.8 68.9 80.2
Static specifiaction, One-Step 54.9 64.3 67 67.8
Static specification, two-Step 55.2 65.1 66.8 67.5
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(Fig.7a) FI−Elasticity of Absolute Consumption Volatility
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